The paper examines decentralized cryptocurrency protocols that are based on the use of internal tokens as identity tools. An analysis of security problems with popular Proof-of-stake consensus protocols is provided. A new protocol, Interactive Proof-of-stake, is proposed. The main ideas of the protocol are to reduce a number of variables a miner can iterate over to a minimum and also to bring a communication into block generation. The protocol is checked against known attacks. It is shown that Interactive Proof-of-stake is more secure than current pure Proof-of-stake protocols.
Introduction
The core feature of Bitcoin is is the ability of every network participant who contributes computational resources to participate in a shared ledger creation process. A few years after the Nakamoto's paper [1] described Proof-of-work and private fork attack, some formal models with comprehensive analysis were published [2, 3] .
In a Proof-of-work system participants solve moderately hard computational puzzles [3] to generate valid blocks. The probability of generation is proportional to their computational power (with some exceptions [4, 2] ).
The puzzles could be viewed as identity tools that prevent Sybil attacks in an anonymous environment. An alternative idea behind Proof-of-stake protocols uses internal tokens of a cryptocurrency as identity tools.
Proof-of-stake was first implemented in PeerCoin [5] .
Email address: kushti@protonmail.ch (Alexander Chepurnoy) Then the concept was developed into several variations having similar problems with their security models.
NeuCoin [6] and Nxt are the Proof-of-stake protocol examples considered below.
NeuCoin
Neucoin uses the same transactional model as Bitcoin, with a transaction having multiple inputs and outputs. An unspent output holder has a right to generate a block if hash(k) g * v o * δ where g is the target value readjusted on each block and stored in a block header, v o is the unspent output value, and δ is the amount of time since the coins were touched. The kernel k is:
In the formula for k, t is the current timestamp, t utxo is a timestamp of the output, n utxo is an index of the output in its transaction, i o is an index of the output in its block, t block is a timestamp of a block containing an output, and s is the stake modifier, a 64-bit string seeded from the blockchain.
Nxt
Nxt has a different transactional model than Bitcoin, with dedicated accounts holding balances. Accounts are allowed to generate a block if the hit, an unsigned number constructed from 256-bit generation signature, is less than the target:
where f 8bu return the first 8 bytes of a byte array as an unsigned number, t is the base target of a previous block, b is the account balance N blocks ago, and δ is the delay in since the last block.
The generation signature in the formula above is a deterministic value that depends on the value used to generate the previous block g prev and the account's public key k pub :
The base target also changes between blocks. As the desirable delay between blocks is T seconds, the new base target can be calculated from the base target of a previous block t prev :
2 ) Every block header contains a generation signature g and a base target t. Cumulative difficulty d c is used to determine the best blockchain, with larger values corresponding to better chains:
If every block in a chain is generated within ( T 2 , 2 * T ) seconds of the previous block, d c is proportional to the time elapsed since the genesis block timestamp.
Why Proof-of-stake Matters
There are several reasons to search for protocols beyond the well-known Bitcoin consensus protocols. First of all, Proof-of-stake provides an incentive to run a full-node [7] . Second, a new cryptocurrency using a Proof-of-work consensus protocol could be destroyed by Goldfinger attack [8] . Proof-of-work could also be infeasible for private blockchains. While traditional Byzantine Agreements [9] could work well for a networks consisting of a few banks, Proof-of-stake seems to be more suitable for large private blockchains with unequal generation rights.
Structure of the Paper
Section 2 describes some problems with existing Proof-of-stake consensus protocols. An alternative stake-based protocol, the Interactive Proof-of-stake, is proposed in Section 3. The novel approach is discussed in Section 4.
Open Problems With Existing Proof-of-stake Implementations
Many attacks against Proof-of-stake consensus protocols have been proposed. Following list has been compiled based on papers [10, 7] , internet resources[11, 12, 13] and private conversations. 
Private-fork and Nothing-at-Stake attacks
Compared to Proof-of-work protocols, it is extremely cheap to start a fork with Proof-of-stake.
Simulations show that short private forks are profitable for big stakeholders of Nxt [14] . Therefore, selfish miners have an incentive to build on top of every fork they encounter. However, as the number of forks increases exponentially with time, it is not viable to contribute to all of them, so a node retains best forks.
With the network contributing to a tree that con- 
History Attacks
Attackers can buy unused private keys held a majority of stake being online in the past, then a better chain could be generated [12] . A checkpointing mechanism is needed to prevent this kind of attack.
Bribe Attacks
After an attacker sends a transaction to the network, and some number k of confirmations a transaction recipient performs a corresponding action, such as sending goods out. Then a sender can publicly announce a reward for a better fork, reversing the last k + 1 blocks to remove the transaction from the blockchain. Such an attack is also possible with Proof-of-work protocol, but unsuccessful attack miners would lost a lot of resources in the attack. In contrast, bribed miners in a Proof-of-stake protocol will never lose anything because they can contribute to both forks for very little [10] .
Why Proof-of-stake Cryptocurrencies Work
No practical implementations of the aforementioned attacks are currently known. There are two reasons for this:
Security Through Default Implementation
Nxt and private forks are discussed here. The single existing Nxt protocol implementation, Nxt Reference Software(NRS), stores only a single blockchain. A big stakeholder can earn more [14] by adding an explicit local blocktree storage to the software. Then she can distribute the modified software. Nothing-at-Stake attacks are only a threat when a majority of online are using the modified software. There is a little incentive to modify a single copy even because current mining rewards are small.
Security Through Checkpoints
With NRS, Nxt has a few hard-coded checkpoints and a 720-block reversal limit so only new nodes that are downloading the best chain from the genesis block could suffer a successful History attack resulting in a fork not deeper than a hardcoded checkpoint.
Both practical security measures are inappropriate for long-term use with decentralized cryptocurrency that is intended for global adoption. In contrast, private blockchains can be assumed to be a running specific protocol implementation on most of their nodes.
Interactive Proof-of-stake
There are two main idea behind this new protocol.
First of all, a number of variables a miner can iterate over is needed to be reduced to a minimum to increase resistance to grinding attacks. Second, we would like Using this data we can calculate a score s t of a ticket. First, we calculate hash(seed ∪ pk). Then the first byte of the digest is used to generate T icket1, the second, to generate T icket2, and the third to generate T icket3. The byte value is an unsigned number m. If 0 < m R, where R is some constant, then s t = m * log 2 b; otherwise s t = 0.
For a block of height h an account can generate up
to three tickets with positive score: an instance of T icket1 by using the seed of a block at height h−2, an instance of T icket2, using the seed of a block at height h − 1, and an instance of T icket3, using the seed of a block at height h. If a ticket's score is positive, then the account signs it and broadcasts to the network. Ticket size (including a signature) is about 100 bytes, so tickets can be propagated around the network quickly and effectively.
6. Only one ticket per account per last l blocks is allowed.
7. Only the T icket1 instance generator forms a block containing transactions and the three tickets.
A blockchain begins with three genesis blocks in-
stead of one to avoid breaking ticket generation rules for the first block after genesis. 9 . If the three tickets of a block are generated by accounts with public keys pk 1 , pk 2 , and pk 3 then the seed of that block is calculated as seed = hash(seed prev ∪ pk 1 ∪ pk 2 ∪ pk 3 ), where seed prev is the seed of a previous block. D is large, a chain without hanging problems will get a block with a better s t i values, and additional blocks will be generated during the delay.
12. Block reward is to be split equally amongst ticket generators.
13. It is necessary to limit block generation frequency.
For example, a minimum delay after the last block and a propagation rule like the one used for Nxt could be specified. 
Discussion of the Protocol

Time and Balance
The protocol does not include timestamps or time delays and is therefore immune to time drifting attacks.
The protocol's balance is static. To implement the protocol, we could use an account balance from N blocks ago, as Nxt does.
The Protocol Simulation
An executable simulation of the protocol has been published online under a public domain license [16] .
Wealth distribution in Bitcoin is described by a stretched exponential function [17] . For simplicity, a negative exponential distribution with λ = 50 was used to simulate block generation. The simulation consisted of 800 accounts sharing approximately 1.6 billion coins and generating 30,000 empty blocks (R = 16, l = 10).
The results were as follows:
1. ≈ 89% of accounts generated at least one ticket 2. Poor(< 0.1% of stake) and rich(> 0.7%) accounts held disproportionally low shares of tickets Under conditions of optimal stake distribution, History attacks have the same chances of success as the aforementioned private fork attacks if none of the purchased accounts participate in block generation after the attack has begun. In practice, both requirements are unlikely to be met, so the chance of success will be lower than of a private fork attack.
Bribe attacks
We consider a set of online accounts to be static during a bribe attack. At the moment of bribe proposal the best possible chain suffix of k blocks has already been generated and therefore cannot be substituted. An attacker can offer a bribe in advance of an attack to postpone best ticket publishing, but the ticket reward will be lost if the attack fails. Also collusion between more parties is required than in existing Proof-of-stake protocols. 
Block Trees
We argue there is no incentive even for a large stakeholder to modify the node software aiming to contribute to multiple chains. Even if she has enough stake to compete with the rest of the network, she is whether working on her own chain or network's. However, if the majority of miners are already working on multiple chains, the best strategy for a single miner is to contribute to all of them.
Related Work
The prospect of having multiple block generators was raised in the Proof-of-activity proposal [7] , which considered extending Proof-of-work via additional stakeholder signatures. The Chains-of-activity proposal [10] extends the Proof-of-activity lottery to a pure Proof-ofstake protocol, in which each block provides a single random bit and a sequence of random bits determines a future block generator. The Tendermint whitepaper [18] offers Byzantine Agreements to participants who have made security deposits.
Further Work
Dynamic R Calculation
It can be difficult to set the best single static R value for the entire lifespan of a blockchain system. The more sophisticated option is to dynamically change R based on generation process characteristics. This could make private fork attacks harder to perform.
Proof-of-w ork Tickets
Tickets could be used in Proof-of-Work protocols aiming to spread rewards more evenly and reduce selfish mining attack [4] probability.
A Hybrid Protocol
The Interactive Proof-of-stake protocol can be used in combination with Proof-of-work. Empty Proof-of-work blocks could act as random beacons [19] to generate the tickets for the next S blocks. They could also act as decentralized voting tools to enforce chain selection in a Proof-of-stake blocktree. External random beacons could eliminate grinding atacks. Chain selection enforcement for a blocktree via decentralized voting could eliminate forks deeper than S blocks. A hybrid protocol would remind Bitcoin-NG [20] with many stakeholders (rather than a single miner) working on microblocks.
This way the network participants have Proof-of-work security guarantees, fast blocks and an incentive to run a full-node.
Conclusion
We have analyzed possible security problems of Nevertheless, the new protocol could be useful for private blockchains and hybrid (Proof-of-work mixed with Proof-of-stake) protocols.
